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Zero Mostel: You were saying that under the right circum-
stances, a producer could make more money with a flop than he
could with a hit?
Gene Wilder: Yes. It's quite possible.
Zero Mostel: You keep saying that, but you don't tell me how!
How can a producer make more money with a flop than he could
with a hit?
Gene Wilder: Well, it's simply a matter of creative accounting.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the motion picture The Producers, Gene Wilder and Zero
Mostel have the witty banter written above. Their exchange is un-
fortunately indicative of a very real problem in the motion picture
industry. The method by which motion picture studios calculate
profits has been increasingly disputed in recent months by those
who anticipated fame and fortune from sharing in the "net profits"
of a motion picture. The problem with this "creative accounting" is
that the resulting "net profits" rarely materialize. A person unfa-
miliar with studio accounting practices might assume that a mo-
tion picture makes a profit after the amount of money laid out as
an initial investment is recouped. However, profits are not so easily
calculated in the entertainment industry.
* J.D., Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 1992; B.A., Hofstra University,
1988.
1. Primetime Live: Fatal Subtraction (ABC News television broadcast, Mar. 22, 1990)
(quoting THE PRODUCERS (Embassy Pictures 1968)).
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In reality, a film begins to show a profit only at the "break-
even" point. According to Robert Enders, an entertainment attor-
ney specializing in the motion picture and television areas, the
"break-even" point is defined as a rare occurrence because "in
most cases the costs of a film escalate far ahead of the pace at
which receipts are generated."' Furthermore, Mr. Enders states
that, "fewer than five percent of motion pictures released earn a
profit."3
In order to arrive at the "break-even" point, a studio deducts
certain amounts from its share of the money generated from ticket
revenues. When the press reports that a film "grossed" a particular
dollar amount, the general misconception is that this whole
amount is received by the studio.4 However, approximately forty to
sixty percent of the ticket revenue first goes to the theaters that
exhibited the motion picture. Costs of production (also referred to
as the negative cost), distribution fees, advertising fees, and nu-
merous surcharges are then deducted from this amount. The re-
maining amount, if any, is the "net profit." If the profit participant
had enough clout, he or she could have negotiated a percentage of
the gross received by the studio. In this instance, the percentage
could have been taken "off the top" (before anything is deducted),
at the "break-even point" or any other point in time that the
agreement would define.
This Article will review how net profits are determined in the
motion picture industry, analyze the effects Buchwald v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp.5 may have on the way contracts for net prof-
its participation are made in the future, and offer a variety of ex-
pert opinions on the way business practices in the industry may
change as a result of the Buchwald decision. This Article also in-
cludes interviews with the named plaintiff in the case, Art Buch-
wald, and one of his attorneys, Zazi Pope. Neither Paramount Pic-
tures, nor its counsel responded to numerous requests for
comment, other than what was already stated in the press.
2. Entertainment Finance Special Report, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., August 1990, at
F37.
3. Id.
4. See Letters to the Editor, WALL ST. J., April 27, 1990, at A13 (where a letter to the
editor criticized the press for giving the public the impression that studios receive more
money then they actually do; he wished to make it clear that the total gross revenue from
ticket sales is not kept by the studio, but is first shared with exhibitors and then has ex-
penses deducted.).
5. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 17 Media L. Rep (BNA) 1257 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1990).
[Vol. 10:51
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IL Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
In early 1982, Art Buchwald' (Buchwald) prepared a screen
treatment, eight pages in length entitled "It's a Crude, Crude
World."' In March 1982, Buchwald sent his treatment to Alain
Bernheim (Bernheim).8 Bernheim had registered the work with the
Writers Guild of America, as a way of documenting Buchwald's
claim that it was his own work as of that date.9 Buchwald then
condensed his eight page treatment into three pages, which still
contained the essence of the original. 10 It was then pitched to Par-
amount Pictures by Bernheim as a vehicle for actor Eddie
Murphy."
Paramount expressed tremendous interest in the possibility of
developing the concept into a feature film. Bernheim was signed as
a producer, and Buchwald sold his rights to his story which was
then entitled King for a Day." In addition to the rights to the
story, Paramount had various options to extend the time in which
they were given to develop the story into a motion picture. "Ac-
cording to Paramount creative executive David Kirkpatrick, in his
ten years at Paramount, Buchwald's treatment was the only one
optioned by Paramount." 3 Prior to reviewing Buchwald's treat-
ment, Paramount had only optioned screenplays."'
By July 1984, two options had been exercised on Buchwald's
work. A third option, a one year extension, was purchased by Kirk-
patrick "for cheap money" upon the instruction of then studio
chief Jeffrey Katzenberg. 5 On March 29, 1985, Bernheim received
notice that the project was in "turnaround.""6 In May 1986, Buch-
wald had found another studio to option his story." By November
1987, Bernheim had received information that Paramount was pro-
6. Art Buchwald is a syndicated columnist and Pulitzer Prize-winning author based
at THE WASH. POST.
7. Buchwald, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1257.
8. Id. (Bernheim was also a plaintiff in the case).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Buchwald, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1258.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1260.
16. Id. (The phrase "turnaround" allows the producer one year to take the project to
another studio and offer it as his own without help or interference from the original studio.
The new studio, however, must reimburse the original studio for any pre-production or de-
velopment costs.)
17. Id. at 1261.
1993]
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ceeding with a project that bore a striking resemblance to Buch-
wald's story and that it starred Eddie Murphy, the same actor
Bernheim had suggested for the role.18 After a meeting between
Bernheim and a Paramount executive, the studio "insisted" that
their new project had no relation to Buchwald's story.19 In January
1988, Warner Bros. Inc., the studio that Buchwald made the sec-
ond deal with, cancelled the project clearly citing Paramount's film
starring Eddie Murphy as one of the reasons.2 0 Buchwald and
Bernheim then commenced an action against Paramount Pictures
Corporation.
Buchwald said that most people "were extremely supportive of
his decision to bring the action, but [they did so] off the record,
from fear of retaliation."'" "Unfortunately, the Writers Guild was
the least supportive," he continued. Buchwald acknowledged that
the lack of support was probably because the Guild didn't want to
alienate themselves from the studios with whom they worked so
closely.22
During the first phase of the trial, the court concluded that
"Coming to America was a [motion picture] based upon Buch-
wald's treatment King for a Day," and that the works were "sub-
stantially similar. ' 23 Judge Harvey A. Schneider ruled that the
case was not about whether "Eddie Murphy 'stole' Buchwald's
concept King for a Day.'' 24 He continued, "[r]ather, this case is
primarily a breach of contract case between Buchwald and Para-
mount (not Murphy) which must be decided by reference to the
agreement between the parties and the rules of contract construc-
tion, as well as the principles of law enunciated in the applicable
legal authorities." 5 The Judge decided that the second phase of
the trial would focus on the contract that was made and determine
the enforceability of such an agreement.
In the second phase of the trial, the court reached "the ines-
capable conclusion that the Bernheim-Paramount contract [was] a
contract of adhesion."2" The court defined a contract of adhesion
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Telephone interview with Art Buchwald, syndicated columnist and Pulitzer Prize
winning author based at THE WASH. POST (May 21, 1992).
22. Id.
23. Buchwald, 17 Media. L. Rep. (BNA) at 1267.
24. Id. at 1261.
25. Id.
26. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C 706083 (Cal. Superior, Dec. 21,
1990) Phase II at 5 (not officially published)[hereinafter Buchwald Phase II].
[Vol. 10:51
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as "a standardized contract which, imposed and drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.""
Although Paramount claimed that "it freely negotiates its net
profit formula with the talent," the court concluded that the
"plaintiffs have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
Paramount [Pictures] negotiate[d] its net profit formula with only
a relatively small number of persons who possess the necessary
'clout,' and even these negotiations result in changes that are cos-
metic, rather than substantive. 2 8 The court also noted that
"[T]here is evidence in the record to support the conclusion that
essentially the same negotiations are conducted at all studios and
that when one studio revises a provision of its net profit formula,
that revision is adopted by the other studios."' 9
The court also held that "certain provisions of Paramount's
net profit formula were unconscionable." 30 According to the court,
California Civil Code section 1670.5 states "[ilf the court as a mat-
ter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the ap-
plication of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscion-
able result."'3 1
Among the seven provisions struck down (similar to those dis-
cussed subsequently regarding a competing studio), was a ten per-
cent advertising surcharge found not to be in proportion to actual
costs, a fifteen percent overhead surcharge for overhead which was
determined not to be in proportion to actual costs, and the interest
on the production costs and overhead.3 2 Paramount offered no jus-
tification for any of these charges, except the fifteen percent over-
head charge, which was "abandoned during a hearing held in the
case."33 Zazi Pope,34 one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs, said
that "[Paramount] originally had a 'risky business' defense that
motion pictures are risky ventures and that winning films pay for
27. Id. at 3 (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. 28 Cal.3d 807, 817 (1981)).
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 4,5.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id. at 6, n.2 (citing CAL. CIViL CODE §1670.5).
32. Id. at 24, 25.
33. Id. at 25.
34. Telephone interview with Zazi Pope, an attorney with the Los Angeles office of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (May 18, 1992).
1993]
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losers." She added that, "[t]hey abandoned this defense when they
became aware of having to subject their files to disclosure of prior
dealings.""a
In the third phase of the trial, the court had to determine
what damages, if any, the plaintiffs were entitled under the re-
maining terms of the contract. The court "declined to accept" ei-
ther the plaintiffs' or defendants' evidence regarding the value of
both Buchwald's and Bernheim's services and decided to rely upon
a previous ruling as a guideline.36 Under the original terms of his
contract, Buchwald was to receive "65,000 dollars, 1.5 percent of
the net profits, and a screen credit if Paramount made a movie
based upon his story."37 Bernheim, as producer, was to earn
"200,000 dollars plus 40 percent of the net profits, reducible to 17.5
percent under a studio formula . . 8
The court relied upon a case which stated that if a conflicting
range of testimony was offered by both the plaintiff and defendant,
the court was vested with the authority to "decide upon a value
which falls in between the range of the opinion testimony." " The
court also decided to apply a rule of law that was generally re-
served for eminent domain cases which state, "[t]he fair market
value of property taken for which there is no relevant market is its
value on the date of valuation as determined by any method of
valuation that is just and equitable."'40
In estimating the value of Bernheim's services, the court held
that 750,000 dollars was "fair and just compensation" for his con-
tribution to Paramount's motion picture.41 "The court observe[d]
that, given the fact it was stipulated that Paramount ha[d] earned
tens of millions of dollars of gross profits from 'Coming to
America,' the compensation awarded to Bernheim represent[ed]
less than 1 percent of Paramount's gross profits (if 'Coming to
America' generated gross profits as high as $100 million) and less
than 5 percent of the Paramount's gross profits (if 'Coming to
America' generated gross profits as low as $20 million). ' 42 The
35. Id.
36. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C 706083 (Cal. Superior, Mar. 16,
1992) Phase III at 4 (not officially published) [hereinafter Buchwald Phase III].
37. PIERCE O'DONNELL & DENNIS McDoUGAL, FATAL SUBTRACTION: THE INSIDE STORY
OF Buchwald v. Paramount xxv (1992).
38. Id.
39. Buchwald Phase III at 4, 5 (citing People ex. rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Penin-
sula Enterprises, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 332, 346-347 (1979).
40. Id. at 6 (citing CAL.'Crv. PROc.CODE § 1263.320 (b)).
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id.
(Vol. 10:51
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court based its decision on testimony that, "Paramount and other
studios consider[ed] one percent of gross profits to be the
equivalent of two percent of net profits."4
An expert for the plaintiffs had testified that Bernheim should
have received contingent compensation of between twelve and one-
half percent and thirty-five percent of net profits, which never ma-
terialized.44 An expert for the Defendant testified that the amounts
were between five and ten percent.4 The court took the low num-
ber from each and utilized the two to one conversion, arriving at a
figure of six and one-quarter percent using an estimate of
20,000,000 dollars as the gross profits that Paramount received."
This resulted in a range of possible damages of 500,000 dollars to
1,200,000 dollars, from which the court decided on the 750,000 dol-
lar amount.4"
In estimating the value of Buchwald's services, the court relied
upon several factors. First, Buchwald had a unique concept. Sec-
ond, Buchwald would have received a large amount of media atten-
tion for creating the concept of a major motion picture. Third, Par-
amount's earnings of "tens of millions of dollars of gross profits"
(emphasis added) from their production of Coming to America was
significant because the story was based upon Buchwald's idea. 8
The court arrived at a figure of 150,000 dollars, which was not
even close to the 6,200,000 dollars that Buchwald's expert had
opined he was entitled to." The court's award of damages to Buch-
wald ended up being almost twice the amount that Paramount's
expert had indicated as being appropriate. ° In the decision, there
was no mention of the method upon which Buchwald's one and
one-half percent interest in the net profits was converted into gross
profit share.
Prior to this phase of the trial, the plaintiffs had estimated
their combined damages to be 28,000,000 dollars, to which the de-
fendant had replied, "Buchwald and Bernheim must be floating in
never-never land. ' 51 When questioned whether the plaintiffs had
overestimated the value of the case, their attorney Zazi Pope re-
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Suit Asks Slice of 'America' Pie, WASH. POST, Jan 17, 1992, at C6.
19931
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plied, "[t]he judge in this case was traditionally conservative re-
garding damages. '52 The distribution of any net profits to profit
participants was not discussed in the case specifically, because Par-
amount had claimed that Coming to America was still showing no
profits and had a deficit of 18,000,000 dollars.5 3 Since the net prof-
its the plaintiffs were entitled to never materialized, the court de-
cided to use an alternative method of computing compensation for
the plaintiffs. For a complete breakdown of an estimate of Para-
mount's net profit participation statement for Coming to America,
please see Appendix A.54
III. ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY DEFINITION OF NET PROFITS
The number of ways the term "net profits" has been defined is
equalled only by the number of reactions the use of the term will
evoke. A studio attorney may state that net profits are paid to an
individual after the studio has recouped its initial costs of financ-
ing, producing, and distributing a motion picture. This attorney
would be likely to further argue that the surcharges and other
costs of overhead that are deducted from the studio's share of the
gross help offset the costs of running a studio and absorb the losses
from failed ventures. However, an attorney on the other side of a
bargaining table would be likely to offer a different opinion. Pierce
O'Donnell, an attorney with the Los Angeles office of Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, who represented writer Art
Buchwald and producer Alain Bernheim in their case against Para-
mount, said "[i]n the Alice in Wonderland world of Paramount
and every other studio, net profits are not profits, profits are ex-
penses, and break even is not an even break." 55 Eddie Murphy, an
actor who has had a long-term affiliation with Paramount Pictures
commented, "[n]et profits are monkey points- you look at them
[in the agreement] and laugh like a monkey."56
In response to criticism that few profit participants receive
any money for their share of net profits, Paramount Pictures re-
leased a list of twenty-nine motion pictures that have paid net
profits to eighty-nine actors, directors, writers, and producers since
52. Telephone interview with Zazi Pope, supra note 34.
53. Henry J. Tashman, Hit Picture Still Shows No Profit, THE NAT'L L.J., April 30,
1990, at 17.
54. See id. (The figures stated in the article are "reconstructed based upon Para-
mount's interrogatory answers in the case and the plaintiffs' contract with Paramount.")
55. Dick Goldberg, Studio Claims 29 of Its Films Paid Net Profits, L.A. DAILY J., July
16, 1990, at 1.
56. Id.
[Vol. 10:51
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1975.17 No breakdown was given regarding whether actors, direc-
tors, writers, or producers had received a greater share of this
money, nor were any of specific identities revealed. This informa-
tion would appear pertinent to the Buchwald and Bernheim case
and is likely to be the reason why the information was not dis-
closed. Among the films listed that accounted for 155,000,000 dol-
lars in net profit payments, were: Grease, The Bad News Bears,
Ordinary People, Star Trek II, III, IV, and Flashdance.58 Also in-
cluded on the list were the following motion pictures that Eddie
Murphy appeared in: Trading Places, 48 Hours, Beverly Hills Cop,
Beverly Hills Cop II, and Raw (concert film).6
Some. profit participants who received net profits were more
than happy to discuss how it affected them. Douglas Day Steward,
who wrote the screenplay for An Officer & A Gentleman claimed
he received over 5,000,000 dollars from his five percent share of the
net profits.6 0 He said for that film "there were no gross profit par-
ticipants."'" This meant that nobody received money before the
expenses were deducted by the studio. He conceded, however, that
today he knows that gross percentage points deducted from the
start "affect the [possibility] of net [profits] down the line" and he
would "not expect that type of payout anymore. '62
There are many well known people in the entertainment in-
dustry who have quietly challenged studio accounting practices.
The reason they do not receive much publicity is because their
cases are usually settled and have the terms of the agreement
sealed by the court. Occasionally such settlements leak out and be-
come public. For example, actor James Garner of The Rockford
Files, was contractually entitled to thirty-seven percent of the net
profits from his television series, yet received an amount less than
300,000 dollars. 3 He sued and reached a settlement of approxi-
mately 12,000,000 dollars.6 4
In another television related dispute, the series Hart to Hart
became the subject of litigation regarding its net profits. 65 This se-
ries had been syndicated in seventy-five countries and had grossed
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Goldberg, supra note 55.
62. Id.
63. Dana Wechsler, Profits? What Profits?, FORBES, February 19, 1990, at 38.
64. Id. Pierce O'Donnell represented NBC as co-plaintiff with James Garner against
Universal/MCA. See O'DONNELL & McDouoL, supra note 37.
65. Id.
19931
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137,000,000 dollars, yet it still showed a loss of 16,000,000 dollars
in November of 1985.66 Sidney Sheldon, creator of the show and
stars Robert Wagner and Stephanie Powers, who were supposed to
share in the net profits, sued Columbia Pictures Industries and
Spelling-Goldberg Productions "for systematically rendering false
and fraudulent accounting statements.""7  A settlement was
reached in 1989 for approximately 5,000,000 dollars.8
IV. EVOLUTION OF NET PROFITS
In Buchwald v. Paramount, Mel Sattler, former head of busi-
ness affairs at Universal Pictures, testified for the defendant Para-
mount in a deposition that the concept of net profits "started with
actor Jimmy Stewart's back-end deal"9 for Winchester '73, in
1950. "1 70 At that time, Stewart commanded an acting fee of 250,000
dollars per motion picture, which the financially strapped Univer-
sal Studios could not afford.71 "In lieu of an up front salary, Stew-
art agreed to star for fifty percent of the landmark western's 'net
profits,' defined as any receipts after the film earned back twice its
negative [production] cost."' 72 Sattler added that "[i]f 'Winchester'
never reached break-even, the actor would have received nothing
for his services. ''7 He continued, "[n]et profit deals today come in
addition to up front compensation -and don't require the performer
to share the risks. '7 4 It is because of this change that Sattler
claims that net profit participants today do not have as strong a
claim for sharing in the profits.75 This opinion is probably based on
the fact that the professionals in today's entertainment industry
often belong to guilds which have the bargaining power to watch
over that person's interests. In turn, these guild members may
have acquired guaranteed minimum compensation through various
collective bargaining agreements. For instance, before entering into
an agreement, a writer can consult with a representative of the
Writers Guild and obtain general guidelines and the guild mini-
66. Wechsler, supra note 63.
67. Id. at 39.
68. Id.
69. A back end deal is one where a share of profits, if any, is received after all deduc-
tions have been made.
70. Life After Buchwald, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., August 1990, at F-26,27.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 27.
74. See id.
75. See id.
[Vol. 10:51
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mums for sale of a literary work for use in a motion picture.
However, quite a few cases contradict this assessment of the
history of net profits. For example, in 1946, Bercovici v. Chaplin76
involved a dispute over sharing the net profits from producing mo-
tion pictures. In Holmes v. Columbia Pictures Corporation" the
dispute was over a third party receiving net profits. Although these
cases did not receive a full trial on their merits or the legality of
net profits, the cases clearly indicate that net profit participation
existed before 1950. Zazi Pope, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs
Art Buchwald and Alain Bernheim in the Paramount case, specu-
lated that "[m]aybe [actor Jimmy] Stewart was the first to openly
talk about such an agreement, but we did know [at trial] of the
existence of other net profit agreements prior to the date that the
defendant's witness had claimed. 7
8
V. WHERE DOES THE MONEY Go?
The following is an analysis of pertinent sections of a sample
net profits agreement used by Warner Bros. Inc. and is representa-
tive of most net profit agreements prior to the Buchwald decision.
A reproduction of these sections can be found in Appendix B, how-
ever the entire text of the agreement is readily available in many
legal libraries. It can be found in either the loose-leaf treatise,
"Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts,"79 or in the
Practising Law Institute's "Counseling Clients in the Entertain-
ment Industry."80
The analysis starts first with paragraphs two and three. Para-
graph two defines net profits as "[an amount equal to the excess,
if any, of the gross receipts of the Picture" less distribution fees,
expenses, costs of production, interest, and any other costs. Ac-
cording to paragraph three, receipts from ticket sales are not in-
cluded in the gross receipts accounting figures until "actually re-
ceived." This qualification affects the calculation of net profits. In
generally accepted accounting methods any outstanding money
owed to the studio would be labeled "accounts receivable" and
would be considered an asset. In this contract, no provision exists
76. See Bercovici v. Chaplin, 7 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
77. See Holmes v. Columbia Pidures Corp., 109 F.Supp. 327 (S.D.Cal. 1953).
78. Telephone interview with Zazi Pope, supra note 34.
79. 2 ALEXANDER M. LINDEY, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS:
AGREEMENTS AND THE LAW, at 5-167 (1992).
80. 2 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUS-
TRY, at 581 (1992).
1993]
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for anticipated revenue counting as an asset. Therefore, it gives the
appearance that the motion picture has less revenues than it actu-
ally does. According to the clause and the rider, any money owed
from Warner's direct distribution or from exhibitors under
Warner's control was not included in the gross receipt calculations
until that money was "actually received" by the studio.
It is of interest to note that a similar method of accounting
was used by Paramount Pictures regarding the disputed contract
in the Buchwald case. According to Pierce O'Donnell, attorney for
the plaintiffs, "Paramount maintained two accounting systems: one
for itself and another for its net profit participants." '81 He contin-
ued, "the first set of books, based on what accountants call gener-
ally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), was how Paramount
was legally obligated to account to its stockholders, the IRS, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission. "82
Query whether the logic of excluding money owed but not yet
paid to Warner from the gross receipt calculation, given standard
accounting principles, makes sense. The deviation from standard
practice in determining gross receipts not only appears inequitable,
but also hints at a deliberate attempt by the studio to withhold
earnings due the profit participant through their "creative ac-
counting". Thus, the inequity of the "actually received" require-
ment cannot be overstated. In addition, if the money is owed from
a division under Warner's control, what is the reason for the ab-
sence of provisions setting guidelines for time limitations on the
transfer of funds to the parent company? Even absent such con-
trol, the net profit participant would understand the entire finan-
cial picture more thoroughly by receiving an accounting of any an-
ticipated revenue which is outstanding.
Next, according to paragraph four, distribution fees range
from thirty to forty percent of the gross receipts. In addition to
this percentage being deducted from the studio's share of the gross
receipts, so are expenses associated with distribution. According to
David Robb, a noted entertainment journalist affiliated with The
Hollywood Reporter, "[t]he distribution fee is essentially a sales
commission for booking the film into theatres all over the world,
for collecting these revenues, and for negotiating deals for the dis-
tribution of the film on TV, pay TV, and in-flight showings."8
81. O'DONNELL & McDoUGAL, supra note 37.
82. Id.
83. David Robb, How studios determine their distribution fees, THE HOLLYWOOD
REP., August 17, 1992, at 18.
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Paragraph five defines these expenses as "whatever kind or
nature. . . [that is] customary. . .in the motion picture industry."
This overly inclusive definition of expenses allows creative ac-
countants to reduce gross receipts substantially, thereby causing a
decline in the profit participant's expected earnings pursuant to
their contract.
Paragraph five also gives the studio the option of withholding
''appropriate reserves" of money to be used to pay any outstanding
debts. At first glance, this may appear reasonable, but the rider to
this paragraph states that this money can be held up to eighteen
months, with an even longer period for money set aside for tax
purposes. During this time period, these amounts are not included
in gross receipt calculations. Along with the myriad of creative ac-
counting procedures and write off provisions contained in the con-
tract, no limit exists on the amount of money a studio may with-
hold other than the word "appropriate". This is yet another
example of how overly broad contract provisions can be used to
reduce the profit participant's expectations of income. A more eq-
uitable provision would require that a certain percentage of the
distribution budget be held for a specified period rather than en-
gaging in the uncertainty of what may be deemed "appropriate".
In a further discussion of expenses in paragraph five, subsec-
tion (b), the studio is authorized to spend with "uncontrolled dis-
cretion" any amount that it deems necessary to "exploit" the mo-
tion picture. The only possible problem here is that this money
may be spent at "in house" departments, which may or may not
offer competitive rates for these services. The most striking part of
this clause relates to a ten percent surcharge added on to all costs
from this clause in order to "cover the indirect cost of the studio's
advertising and publicity departments, both domestic and for-
eign." This practice was held unconscionable in the Buchwald de-
cision. 4 If these services were purchased from the studio itself, the
producers had already been charged for these services at a price
which no doubt included a reasonable profit margin. The surcharge
simply adds additional profit for the studio, thereby decreasing the
amount of possible funds available to profit participants. In addi-
tion to the surcharge, the clause also provides for the studio to de-
duct an additional amount of money in order to "receive salaries
and expenses" of all those who had a role in the "preparing and
delivering the motion picture. . . ." Under these terms, mainte-
84. Buchwald Phase H.
1993]
13
Bialow: Illusory Profits: Net Profit Agreements in Light of <em>Buchwald
Published by Institutional Repository, 1993
64 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
nance people or studio guards could feasibly have their salaries
paid by any production which uses the studio's lot.
On top of any costs of the production being deducted from the
gross, an overhead charge of fifteen percent is charged on all ex-
penditures as well as interest on these costs and the surcharge it-
self. In Buchwalds5 , the court found that Paramount had charged
an additional fifteen percent surcharge on studio overhead, which
the court determined had no relevance to the cost of motion pic-
ture production. Having found no relationship between the
surcharge and the cost of production to exist, the court held that
the surcharge and interest provisions to be unconscionable s. 8
Paragraph nine sets forth terms for the computation of inter-
est. The interest rate is "equal to" 125 percent of the prime rate
calculated as of the date that the expenses were charged to the
production. As of May 19, 1992, this would be an interest rate of
8.125 percent.8 If the calculation was for the same period a year
before, the interest rate would have been 10.625 percent.8 The
possibility of fluctuations in the interest rate, no matter how dra-
matic these changes may be, will work to frustrate the profit par-
ticipant's expectations of return at the signing of the contract. Ac-
cording to this agreement, a drop in interest rates would cause the
studio to lose money because of a lower rate of return on what they
consider to be their investment. As a result, the possibility of net
profits being realized is substantially decreased with a drop in the
interest rate. Of course, if interest rates rose, the possibility of net
profits may increase, however, at the expense of the net profit par-
ticipant. An equitable solution would be to set the interest rate at
a specific amount rather than on the prime rate. Another possible
option is to set the interest rate at 125% of the prime rate, but not
more or less than a particular percentage.
In paragraph ten, the relevant provisions discussing the profit
participant's earnings statements are discussed. The paragraph
states that Warner will give the profit participant a "periodic
statement" in "summary form" of any calculations covered by this
agreement. However, the statement provides no pertinent informa-
tion to the profit participant upon which he/she may evaluate
where they stand. A possible solution is to require a periodic state-
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at D-12, (The prime rate for this date was listed as
6.5%.).
88. Id.
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ment containing a reasonably detailed breakdown of all calcula-
tions in order to give the profit participant a realistic picture of
where he/she stands. In addition, this paragraph places a two year
limitation on the amount of time in which the profit participant
may challenge the accuracy of these accounting statements. Fur-
thermore, in a rider to paragraph eleven, there is a similar clause
where the parties to' the contract waive their rights to "file any
suit, action or proceeding against the studio," if the action was not
commenced within a specified time period. Because the profit par-
ticipant does not receive a full and accurate disclosure of the calcu-
lations, it could be long after the contractual limitation period ex-
pires before any discrepancy in the statements would be
discovered.
In paragraph eleven, accounting methods and auditing rights
are discussed. This section states that the profit participant may
have access to the books for an audit, so long as it is done during
"normal business hours" and does not interfere with "normal busi-
ness activities." One problem with this language is that "normal
business activities" are not defined. What if, for example, one
ledger holds the accounting figures for more than one project?
Would the prevention of someone using this book during the audit
constitute a breach? This may appear insignificant at first glance.
However, a dispute over millions of dollars may cause the parties
to act out of the ordinary. Therefore, the clearer this is made to be,
the better off the parties will be later, should a dispute arise.
Another potential problem for the profit participant who
wants to examine the books is contained in a rider to paragraph
eleven. This provision states that the studio is pre-approved to use
certain accounting firms, while any other party to this contract
who wishes to audit the books may only do so if the accountant is
deemed "reputable" by the studio. Rather than requiring a party
to wait for studio approval of an accounting firm, it would be more
equitable to state that any party may use a firm considered one of
"the big six" accounting firms, so long as there is no conflict of
interest. Since the contract already vests Warner with that right,
giving a reciprocal right to the profit participant would be
equitable.
VI. WHAT THE FUTURE MAY HOLD
Although the odds against a deal being made for an unpro-
duced writer are very high, more than 30,000 film and television
scripts were registered with the Writers Guild of America in West
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Hollywood, California last year.89 The relatively small percentage
who were able to make a deal were likely to include some writers
who thought they had made a great deal by receiving a share of the
project's net profits, only to later discover that these percentage
points were virtually worthless. As previously mentioned, only
those parties who had some clout would have been able to negoti-
ate a share of the gross that would put them on par with the stu-
dio. Commenting on the Buchwald decision, Peter Dekom, a Los
Angeles entertainment attorney, claimed that "[it] is a disaster
that will change the entertainment business permanently and irre-
versibly."90 He speculated that "hundreds of writers and producers
will sue studios for new accountings of profits."9'
As a result of the Buchwald case, the studios will more than
likely have to re-write their profit participation agreements to be
in compliance with the court's holding. This will leave studios with
the option of formulating a new method of accounting for profits
or lead to more "up-front" money being paid with little or no share
of profits. Peter Dekom further speculated that studios will be re-
luctant to deal with individuals with "low bargaining power .. .
[because] .. .the studio[s] won't want to take the risk [of being
sued]."92
According to New York entertainment attorney Elliot H.
Brown, a partner at Franklin, Weinrib, Rudell & Vassallo, P.C.,
"[s]o far there does not seem to have been any significant changes
in net profit definitions since the Buchwald case."93 "Warner Bros.,
however, has changed its contract to provide that participants who
would previously have shared in 'net profits,' now share in 'defined
proceeds.' ,,1, A prominent entertainment attorney with over 45
years experience in the field, who wished to remain anonymous,
stated, "Any knowledgeable lawyer, agent, or accountant involved
in the entertainment industry knows that 'net profits' are illusory"
and that these net profit deals evolved primarily "to give the [re-
cipient] the illusion of being a big shot." He added that
"[o]ccasionally they get lucky. .. ."
One studio executive offered his opinion that he did not ex-
pect the decision to hold up on appeal. He analogized the situation
89. HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 12, 1992, at 6.
90. Amy Stevens, Paramount Ordered to Refigure Buchwald's Fee in Movie Dispute,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,1990, at 12.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Elliot H. Brown, Fatal Subtraction, N.Y. L.J., September 14, 1992, at 2.
94. Id.
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to a customer who buys products at a supermarket and then ref-
uses to pay the entire bill because one of the groceries in question
was too high in price. 5 What this attorney did not address was
how he would feel if his understanding of the price of a specific
item was five dollars, but he was billed 1000 dollars. If this were to
happen to him, wouldn't he want to question the price of the other
items on the bill before paying?
Furthermore, a handful of studios control the game. It is their
"bat and ball", so to speak, and they can play with whomever they
choose. The large number of scripts submitted each year exceeds
the small amount which are actually purchased. Not only is this
evidence of the studios stronger bargaining power relative to writ-
ers, but also evinces the competitive nature of the industry. Writ-
ers understand these conditions and feel pressure to close a deal
before an offer is withdrawn. The probable consequence is that
writers are not fully informed regarding the actual value of their
net profit participation.
It has been argued that Buchwald and Bernheim got what
they bargained for in their contracts. If that is the case, are the
agents who make these type of deals for their clients at fault? A
commentary by L. Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal
takes that position.9 6 In his article, Crovitz launched what could be
interpreted to be'a personal attack on Buchwald, and espoused the
view that a contract is sacred and not to be broken. He stated that
"Buchwald brought new meaning to the term 'court jester'. . . and
• . . was not a person with no bargaining power, but a Pulitzer
Prize winning writer who was represented by one of the top execu-
tives at the William Morris Agency." 97
In an interview, Buchwald commented that he didn't person-
ally know Crovitz and couldn't understand his motivation in writ-
ing such an article.9 8 Buchwald responded in his own commentary
that the case would have been dismissed if it was frivolous.9 9 He
wrote the only thing funny about the case was that "Paramount
did a lot of funny things with its books that prevented anyone
from getting net profits."1 ' Buchwald's attorney commented that
95. Dick Goldberg, Entertainment Bar in Uproar Over 'Buchwald', L.A. DAILY J.,
Jan. 3, 1991, at 1.
96. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1991, at A10.
97. Id.
98. Supra note 21 (Buchwald telephone interview).
99. See Art Buchwald, Paramount's Funny Books Are No Laughing Matter, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 23, 1991, at A12.
100. Id.
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the "agents were not at fault because they couldn't get a better
deal."'' She added, "[i]t was an adhesion contract with no oppor-
tunity to negotiate - if you wanted a deal, you agreed to their
terms." 02
Clients would probably be best advised to get as much as they
can in "up-front" compensation, thereby eliminating the need to
rely on the uncertainty of net profits. If this is not possible, then
clients should be informed of the consequences such profit partici-
pations are likely to foster. Pope is of the opinion that studios are
unlikely to use the same formula for net profits in the future and
may rename this type of contract "contingent compensation,"
which would still not guarantee a return.'013
The fact that the contract is renamed "contingent compensa-
tion," or has certain clauses reworded, does not guarantee a greater
chance of receiving any share of profits. Some studios have at-
tempted to minimize the negative connotation that the term "net
profits agreement" now has by telling profit participants that they
are receiving a share of the "adjusted gross profits." In actuality,
the manner by which the adjusted gross profits are calculated is
essentially the same as the former net profit calculations. The re-
cipient is still left with a share of the profits essentially worth
nothing unless the film has a low budget or no gross profit partici-
pants that would affect the potential of future net profits.
Although the Buchwald decision resulted in a 900,000 dollar
verdict for the plaintiffs, one estimate is that the case cost their
attorneys at least 2,500,000 dollars to litigate - a cost clearly not
covered by the attorneys' share of the damages.10 4 Commenting on
the financial loss to his firm, attorney Pierce O'Donnell stated,
"The case had an ironic twist. Everyone made out but the law-
yers."' 10 5 O'Donnell emphasized that "the outcome was a victory for
the creative community," and he looked forward to defending the
decision should the defendants chose to appeal. 0 In addition to
damages, estimated costs to Paramount included 3,000,000 dollars
in legal fees and 300,000 dollars in court costs. 0
Presently, Paramount has not filed an appeal. Under Califor-
101. Telephone interview with Zazi Pope, supra note 34.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. David Robb, Only $150,006 for Buchwald, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., March 17, 1992,
at 1.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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nia law, a notice of appeal must normally be filed "before the earli-
est of" either sixty days after the mailing or service of a "notice of
entry" ' or 180 days after the date of entry of the judgment. '09 If
the notice of appeal is not timely, then the "judgment is affirmed,
notwithstanding any other provision of law. . . and [shall] thereaf-
ter be forever binding and conclusive, as to all matters
adjudicated. .."li
In an action which may test the Buchwald decision, the execu-
tive producers of the motion picture Batman, Benjamin Mel-
niker'" and Michael Uslan, have filed suit against Warner Bros.
Inc. for what they claim is a denial of their share of the profits.1 2
The unconscionability theory in the Buchwald case is the basis of
one of a number of causes of action alleged against Warner Bros.
and may be revisited. The dispute stems from an agreement that
Melniker and Uslan claim to have been "forced to sign," which
"stripped them of their share of the film's gross profits in exchange
for executive producer credits and a share of the film's net
profits." ' 3
According to the article, the motion picture realized over
200,000,000 dollars, but the studio claimed it was still 35,000,000
dollars short of returning any net profits.11 4 As of December 31,
1991, that amount was amended to be gross receipts of greater
than 285,000,000 dollars and a net deficit of still more than
20,000,000 dollars. 1 5 Warner Bros. stated, in its answer to the
complaint, that the cause of action was "frivolous" because the
film had not realized any net profits according to the terms of its
agreement with the plaintiffs."'
According to Art Buchwald, "The studios are still making the
same deals as before, but if the appeal is won, net profits will have
108. According to this statute, a "file-stamped copy of the judgment or appealable
order may be used in place of the document entitled 'notice of entry.'
109. CAL. CT. R., Rule 2(a).
110. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 870.
111. Benjamin Melniker held positions as Vice President-General Counsel and Execu-
tive Vice President of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. from 1954-1970. (employment verified
during phone conversation with Mr. Melnicker on March 1, 1993). It is of interest to note
that Pierce O'Donnell is one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs. See O'DONNELL &
McDOUGAL, supra note 37.
112. Batman Statements Put Accounting in the Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,
1991, at B4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. David Robb, Warners: Bat Suit Frivolous, HOLLYWOOD REP., May 5, 1992, at 4.
116. Id.
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to be redefined permanently. ' 117 "Every person has had a story
about what happened to them similar to mine. There are a lot
more victims than most people think. Most of them can't open
their traps because they're afraid of being boycotted."118 Buchwald
stated that he does not know whether he or his partner, Bernheim,
have been "blacklisted", but does know that Bernheim "[is] cur-
rently involved in some projects."11 9 Buchwald stated that he was
currently spending time working on his autobiography.
Buchwald opined, when asked to speculate as to why Para-
mount did not settle the case, that "[Paramount] thought I would
go away, but I didn't. '" '12 He further explained that as time passed,
the studio tried to settle but wanted to "muzzle him," which Buch-
wald said he would never stand for.121 "If I needed money, maybe I
would have compromised, but I wasn't doing it for the money- it
was more important for me to stand by what I believed in," Buch-
wald continued. 2  He drew the conclusion that "Paramount made
one mistake after another," and referred to it to being "their Viet-
nam. ' 123 Buchwald concluded by stating that the majority of the
general public does not realize the "far-reaching implications that
the case can have in other industries, if the decision is upheld.' 24
Unless the holding of the court is overturned on appeal, "the net
profit formula as written [in the Paramount agreement] no longer
exists," according to Judge Harvey A. Schneider.125
VII. UPDATE
On July 31, 1992, Judge Schneider denied a motion by Para-
mount to vacate and set aside the court's judgment in order to re-
ceive a new trial.126 On August 21, 1992, Paramount filed a notice
of appeal with the California Second District Court of Appeal.12 7
As of March 1993, attorney Charles P. Diamond was "waiting for
the record to be assembled" and he anticipated the filing of the
117. Telephone interview with Art Buchwald, supra note 21.
118. Entertainment Finance Special Report, HOLLYWOOD REP., August 1990, at F27.
119. Telephone interview with Art Buchwald, supra note 21.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Buchwald Phase II, at 30.
126. Paramount Files Notice of Appeal with CA court in Buchwald, ENr. LITIG. REP.,
October 19, 1992.
127. Id.
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actual appeal "within 60 days."'128
Appendix A 29
Net Profit Participation Statement for 'Coming to America'
Item Amount in Millions:
Worldwide Retail Receipts About $ 275
Paramount's Gross Receipts $ 125
Paramount's Distribution Fees $ (42)
Distribution Expenses' $ (36)
Direct & Indirect Cost of Production' 31  $ (59)
TOTAL NET PROFIT (LOSS) WITHOUT $ (12)
INTEREST
INTEREST ON UNRECOUPED PRODUCTION $ (6)
COSTS
TOTAL DEFICIT $ (18)
Appendix B 32
Net Profits Agreement: Selected Provisions
1. Definition of Parties: "Warner" means Warner Bros. Inc., a
Delaware corporation, and its subsidiaries engaged in the business
of distributing motion pictures for exhibition in theatres and for
broadcasting over television stations, but shall not include any
other persons, firms or corporations licensed by Warner to dis-
tribute motion pictures in any part of the world. Nor shall such
term include: any person, firm or corporation distributing the Pic-
ture for purposes other than exhibition in theatres or by television
stations; exhibitors or others who may actually exhibit the Picture
to the public; radio or television broadcasters, cable operators;
manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers of video discs, cassettes or
similar devices; book or music publishers; phonograph record pro-
ducers or distributors; merchandisers, etc., whether or not any of
the foregoing are subsidiaries of Warner. As used herein, a "subsid-
iary" of Warner refers to an entity in which Warner has at least
50% interest.
128. Telephone interview with attorney Charles P. Diamond of the Los Angeles office
of O'Melveny & Meyers (March 18, 1993).
129. Henry J. Tashman, Hit Picture Still Shows No Profit, THE NAT'L L.J., April 30,
1990, at 17.
130. Includes advertising, movie prints and dues.
131. Also known as 'negative costs'
132. LINDEY, supra note 79 (form contributed by John A. Schulman, Esq. and Warner
Bros., Inc., Release #24, September 1991).
1993]
21
Bialow: Illusory Profits: Net Profit Agreements in Light of <em>Buchwald
Published by Institutional Repository, 1993
72 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
"Participant" means the party under the foregoing agreement
who or which is entitled to participate in the gross receipts or net
profits of the Picture, and the successors and permitted assigns of
such party.
2. Net Profits: As between Warner and Participant, the "net
profits" of the Picture means an amount equal to the excess,, if
any, of the gross receipts (as defined in 3 hereof) of the Picture
over the aggregate of the following, which shall be deducted in the
order listed:
(a) Warner's distribution fees set forth in 4 hereof.
(b) Warner's expenses in connection with the distribution of
the Picture, as set forth in 5 hereof.
(c) The cost of production of the Picture, plus an amount
equal to interest thereon, all as provided for in 9 hereof, and plus
such other costs, if any, as may have been incurred in connection
with the financing of the cost of production of the Picture. Said
interest and other costs shall be recouped before said cost of
production.
(d) All contingent amounts consented to by Warner and not
included in the cost of production of the Picture payable to Par-
ticipant or any third party based upon, or computed in respect of,
the gross receipts of the Picture (as defined in the relevant agree-
ments), or any portion thereof.
Net profits shall be determined as of the close of each ac-
counting period provided for in 10 hereof.
3. Gross Receipts: As used herein, the term "gross receipts"
means the aggregate of:
(a) All film retails actually received by Warner from parties
exhibiting the Picture in theatres and on television where Warner
distributes directly to such parties (hereinafter referred to as
"exhibitors").
(b) Where Warner grants theatrical distribution rights to a
subdistributor on a basis requiring it to account to Warner with
respect to film rentals, either: (i) the film rentals received by such
subdistributor from exhibitors which Warner accepts for the pur-
pose of its accountings with such subdistributor; or (ii) Warner's
share (actually received) of film rentals received by such subdis-
tributor; whichever Warner elects from time to time as to each
subdistributor.
(c) In respect of licenses of exhibition or distribution rights by
means of video discs, cassettes or similar devices, an amount equal
to 20% of (i) the gross wholesale rental income therefrom and (ii)
the gross wholesale sales income therefrom less a reasonable allow-
[Vol. 10:51
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ance for returns.
(d) All amounts actually received by Warner from the follow-
ing: (i) trailers (other than trailers advertising television exhibi-
tions of the Picture); (ii) licenses of theatrical distribution rights
for a flat sum; (iii) licenses of exhibition or distribution rights
other than those referred to in (a), (b), (c) and (d) (ii) of this 3,
specifically including licenses to cable operators; (iv) the lease of
positive prints (as distinguished from the licensing thereof for a
film rental); and from the sale or licensing of advertising accesso-
ries, souvenir programs and booklets; and (v) recoveries by Warner
for infringement of copyrights of the Picture.
(e) All monies actually received by Warner on account of di-
rect subsidies, aide or prizes relating specifically to the Picture, net
of an amount equal to income taxes based thereon imposed by the
country involved, if any. If local laws require use of such monies as
a condition to the grant of such subsidy or aide, such monies shall
not be included in gross receipts until actually used.
(f) See Exhibits "1," "2' and "3" attached hereto.
In no event shall rentals from the exhibition of the Picture
which are contributed to charitable organizations be included in
gross receipts.
4. Distribution Fees: Warner's distribution fees shall be as
follows:
(a) 30% of the gross receipts of the Picture derived by Warner
from all sources in the United States and Canada.
(b) 35% of the gross receipts of the Picture derived by Warner
from all sources in the United Kingdom.
(c) 40% of the gross receipts of the Picture derived by Warner
from all sources other than those referred to in (a) and (b) above.
(d) Notwithstanding the foregoing; (i) with respect to sums in-
cluded in the gross receipts pursuant to 3(b)(ii) and 3(d)(ii) hereof,
Warner's distribution fee shall be 15% of such sums; (ii) if Warner
shall license the exhibition of the Picture on free television, the
aforesaid percentages as to amounts received and collected by
Warner from sources in the United States, shall be 30% if col-
lected from a network for national network telecasts in prime time;
.nd 35% in all other instances, and, as to amounts received and
collected by Warner from sources outside the United States 40%;
(iii) no distribution fee shall be charged on gross receipts referred
to in 3(e) or 3(f) hereof.
All distribution fees shall be calculated on the full gross re-
ceipts without any deductions or payments of any kind
whatsoever.
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5. Distribution Expenses: Warner's deductible distribution ex-
penses in connection with the Picture shall include all costs and
expenses incurred in connection with the distribution, advertising,
exploitation and turning to account of the Picture of whatever
kind or nature, or which are customarily treated as distribution ex-
penses under customary accounting procedures in the motion pic-
ture industry. If Warner reasonably anticipates that additional dis-
tribution expenses will be incurred in the future, Warner may, for
a reasonable time, set up appropriate reserves therefor. Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following, particular
items shall be included in distribution expenses hereunder:
(a) The cost and expense of all duped and dubbed negatives,
sound tracks, prints, release prints, tapes, cassettes, duplicating
material and facilities and all other material manufactured for use
in connection with the Picture, including the cost of inspecting,
repairing, checking and renovating film, reels, containers, cassettes,
packing, storing and shipping and all other expenses connected
therewith and inspecting and checking exhibitors' projection and
sound equipment and facilities. Warner may manufacture or cause
to be manufactured as many or as few duped negatives, positive
prints and other material for use in connection with the Picture as
it, in its sole discretion, may consider advisable or desirable.
(b) All direct costs and charges for advertisements, press
books, artwork, advertising accessories and trailers (other than (i)
prints of trailers advertising free television exhibition of the Pic-
ture, and (ii) the trailer production costs which are included in the
cost of production of the Picture), advertising, publicizing and ex-
ploiting the Picture by such means and to such extent as Warner
may, in its uncontrolled discretion, deem desirable, including,
without limitation, pre-release advertising and publicity, so-called
cooperative and/or theatre advertising, and/or other advertising
engaged in with or for exhibitors, to the extent Warner pays,
shares in, or is charged with all or a portion of such costs and all
other exploitation costs relating to such theatre exhibition. Any re-
use fees and costs of recording and manufacturing masters for pho-
nograph records, which Warner shall advance in order to assist in
the advertising and exploitation of the Picture, shall be treated as
costs hereunder to the extent unrecouped by the record company.
Where any Warner advertising or publicity employee (other than
an executive supervisory employee) or facility is used for the Pic-
ture, the salary of such employee and the cost of such facility
(while so used for the Picture) shall be direct costs hereunder. Any,
costs and charges referred to in this (b) (and not included in the
[Vol. 10:51
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cost of production of the Picture), expended or incurred prior to
delivery of the Picture, shall be included in direct costs under this
(b). There shall also be included as an item of cost a sum equal to
10% of all direct costs referred to in this (b) to cover the indirect
cost of Warner's advertising and publicity departments, both do-
mestic and foreign.
(c) All costs of preparing and delivering the Picture for distri-
bution (regardless of whether such costs are the salaries and ex-
penses of Warner's own employees or employees or parties not reg-
ularly employed by Warner), including, without limitation, all
costs incurred in connection with the production of foreign lan-
guage versions of the Picture, whether dubbed, super-imposed or
otherwise, as well as any and all costs and expenses in connection
with changing the title of the Picture, recutting, re-editing or
shortening or lengthening the Picture for release in any territory or
for exhibition on television or other media, or in order to conform
to the requirements of censorship authorities, or in order to con-
form to the peculiar national or political prejudices likely to be en-
countered in' any territory, or for any other purpose or reason. The
costs referred to in this (c) shall include all studio charges for facil-
ities, labor and material, whether or not incurred at a studio owned
or controlled by Warner.
9. Cost of Production; Interest:
(a) The "cost or production" of the Picture means the total
direct cost of production of the Picture, including the cost of all
items listed on Warner's standard Delivery Schedule, computed
and determined in all respects in the same manner as Warner then
customarily determines the direct cost of other motion pictures
distributed and/or financed by it, plus Warner's overhead charge.
The determination of what items constitute direct charges and
what items are within said overhead charge shall be made in all
respects in the same manner as Warner customarily determines
such matters. The full amount of all direct costs of production of
the Picture (whether payable in cash, deferred or accrued) shall be
included in the direct cost of the Picture at the time liability
therefor is incurred or contracted, regardless of whether the same
has actually been paid to the party or parties entitled thereto at
the time involved. Deferments and participations in gross receipts
of the Picture consented to by Warner (however defined) shall be
treated as direct costs of production, whether the same shall be in
a definite amount or based on a percentage of the .gross receipts,
and whether the same are fixed obligations or are contingent upon
receipts of the Picture; provided, however, contingent participa-
1993]
25
Bialow: Illusory Profits: Net Profit Agreements in Light of <em>Buchwald
Published by Institutional Repository, 1993
76 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
tions based on a percentage of gross receipts as defined in the ap-
plicable agreement shall not be included in the direct cost of pro-
duction beyond recoupment under 2(c) hereof.
(b) Warner's overhead charge shall be in an amount equal to
15% of the direct cost of production of the Picture, with the un-
derstanding that any production facilities, equipment or personnel
supplied by Warner or by a studio owned or controlled by Warner,
or in which Warner has a substantial financial interest (and which
are not furnished within the overhead charge) shall be supplied at
Warner's usual rental rates charged for such items, and such
charges shall be treated as direct costs of production of the Picture
and shall bear said 15% overhead charge. Warner's overhead
charge shall accrue and be included in the cost of production of the
Picture concurrently with the incurring of the respective items of
direct cost to which it applies.
(c) The amount equal to interest provided for in 2(c) hereof
shall be calculated at a rate per annum equal to 125% of the prime
commercial rate of First National Bank of Boston from time to
time in effect. Said amount shall be calculated from the respective
dates that each item is charged to the Picture until the close of the
accounting period during which the cost of production is recouped
under 2(c) hereof, except that interest on deferred amounts shall
be calculated from the date of payment.
(d) Concurrently with delivery to Participant of the first earn-
ings statement hereunder, Warner will (subject to revisions and
correction) deliver to Participant an itemized summary of the cost
of production of the Picture. Participant shall have the right to
audit such statement in accordance with 11 hereof.
(e) If the final cost of production shall exceed the budgeted
cost by 5% or more, then for the purposes of 2(c) hereof there shall
be added to the actual cost of production of the Picture an amount
equal to the amount by which the final direct cost exceeds 105% of
the budgeted direct cost. For the purposes of this subdivision (e),
the final direct cost shall not include costs incurred solely by rea-
son of force majeure events, union increases not reflected in the
budget, and over-budget costs incurred at the request of an officer
of Warner having the rank of Vice President or higher over the
written objection of Participant.
10. Earnings Statements: Warner shall render to Participant
periodic statements showing, in summary form, the appropriate
calculations under this Agreement. Statements shall be issued for
each calendar quarter until the Picture has been in release for 4
years from and including the quarter in which the Picture was first
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released, and thereafter annually. Each such quarterly or annual
period, as the case may be, is herein referred to as an "accounting
period." No statements need be rendered for any accounting pe-
riod during which no receipts are received. Statements rendered by
Warner may be changed from time to time to give effect to year-
end adjustments made by Warner's Accounting Department or
Public Accountants, or to items overlooked, to correct errors and
for similar purposes. If Warner shall extend credit to any licensee
with respect to the Picture, and if such credit has been included in
the gross receipts,and if, in the opinion of Warner, any such in-
debtedness shall be uncollectible, the uncollected amount may be
deducted in any subsequent earning statement. Should Warner
make any overpayment to Participant hereunder for any reason,
Warner shall have the right to deduct and retain for its own ac-
count an amount equal to any such overpayment from any sums
that may thereafter become due or payable by Warner to Partici-
pant or for Participant's account, or may demand repayment from
Participant, in which event Participant shall repay the same when
such demand is made. Any U.S. dollars due and payable to Partici-
pant by Warner pursuant to any such statement shall be paid to
Participant simultaneously with the rendering of such statement;
provided, however, that all amounts payable to Participant here-
under shall be subject to all laws and regulations now or hereafter
in existence requiring deduction or withholdings for income or
other taxes payable by or assessable against Participant. Warner
shall have the right to make such deductions and withholdings and
the payment thereof to the governmental agency concerned in ac-
cordance with its interpretation in good faith of such laws and reg-
ulations, and shall not be liable to Participant for the making of
such deductions or withholdings or the payment thereof to the
governmental agency concerned. In any such event Participant
shall make and prosecute any and all claims which it may have
with respect to the same directly with the governmental agency
having jurisdiction in the premises. The right of Participant to re-
ceive, and the obligation of Warner to account for, any share of the
net profits of the Picture shall terminate if the Picture has been
made available for exhibition on syndicated television in the
U.S.A., and if the first earnings statement issued thereafter shows
a deficit under 2 hereof which would require in excess of $500,000
of gross receipts before Participant would be entitled to receive
any net profits hereunder. In the event a new medium of exhibi-
tion shall thereafter be developed and there shall be substantial
exhibition and distribution of the Picture by such new medium
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which is likely to generate gross receipts of $500,000 or the amount
of the deficit, whichever is larger, Participant may audit Warner's
records for the purpose of determining whether the -Picture has
earned, or is likely to earn, any net profits, and if, as a result of
such audit, it is determined by mutual agreement, or in the event
of dispute appropriate legal proceedings, that the Picture has
earned, or is likely to earn, net profits as herein defined, account-
ings hereunder and payments, if required, shall be reinstated.
11. Accounting Records re Distribution: Audit Rights: Warner
shall keep books of account relating to the distribution of the Pic-
ture, together with vouchers, exhibition contracts and similar
records supporting the same (all of which are hereinafter referred
to as "records"), which shall be kept on the same basis and in the
same manner and for the same periods as such records are custom-
arily kept by Warner. Participant may, at its own expense, audit
the applicable records at the place where Warner maintains the
same in order to verify earnings statements rendered hereunder.
Any such audit shall be conducted only by a reputable public ac-
countant during reasonable business hours in such manner as not
to interfere with Warner's normal business activities. In no event
shall an audit with respect to any earnings statement commence
later than twenty-four (24) months from the rendition of the earn-
ings statement involved; nor shall any audit continue for longer
than thirty (30) consecutive business days; nor shall audits be
made hereunder more frequently than once annually; nor shall the
records supporting any earnings statement be audited more than
once. All earnings statements rendered hereunder shall be binding
upon Participant and not subject to objection for any reason unless
such objection is made in writing, stating the basis thereof, and
delivered to Warner within twenty-four (24) months from rendi-
tion of the earnings statement, or if an audit is commenced prior
thereto, within thirty (30) days from the completion of the relative
audit. If Warner, as a courtesy to Participant, shall include cumu-
lative figures in any earnings or other statement, the time within
which Participant may commence any audit or make any objection
in respect of any statement shall not be enlarged or extended
thereby. Participant's right to examine Warner's records is limited
to the Picture, and Participant shall have no right to examine
records relating to Warner's business generally or with respect to
any other motion picture for purposes of comparison or otherwise;
provided, however, that where any original income or expense doc-
ument with third parties relates to the Picture and to other motion
pictures, Participant shall have the right to examine the entire
[Vol. 10:51
28
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 5
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol10/iss1/5
NET PROFIT AGREEMENTS
document without deletions therefrom.
12. Ownership: Participant expressly acknowledges that Par-
ticipant has and will have no right, title or interest of any kind or
character whatsoever in or to the Picture, and no lien thereon or
other rights in or to the gross receipts or net profits of the Picture;
and that the same shall be and remain Warner's sole and exclusive
property, and Warner shall not be obligated to segregate the same
from its other funds, it being the intent and purpose hereof that
the net profits or gross receipts, as the case may be, of the Picture
are referred to herein merely as a measure in determining the time
and manner of payment to Participant; and that Warner shall not
be deemed a trustee, pledgeholder or fiduciary. Participant shall
have no right, title or interest of any kind or character whatsoever
in or to the literary, dramatic or musical material upon which the
Picture is based, or from which it may be adapted; and Warner
shall have the sole and exclusive right to utilize, sell, license or oth-
erwise dispose of all or any part of its right in such material upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem advisable, all without
consulting or advising Participant and without accounting to Par-
ticipant in any manner with respect thereto.
Appendix C133
Net Profits Agreement: Selected Rider Provisions
All paragraph references herein refer to paragraph numbers in
the Exhibit to which this rider is attached. The provisions herein
shall control to the extent they conflict with the provisions in the
Exhibit to which this rider is attached.
Paragraph 2: The first sentence in paragraph 2(c) shall end
after the words "in 9 hereof."
Paragraph 3: Warner shall elect paragraph 3(b)(i) during the
initial theatrical release of the Picture in the following territories:
United Kingdom, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Australia,
New Zealand, Benelux, Scandinavia, Switzerland and Japan.
Gross receipts shall include all sums actually received by
Warner from recoveries of infringement, unfair competition, trade-
mark and piracy actions with respect to the Picture. Recoveries by
Warner from infringement, unfair competition, trademark and
piracy actions with respect to the Picture representing penalties
rather than actual or statutory damages shall be included in gross
receipts of the Picture without any distribution fee. Gross receipts
133. Id. at 5-183.
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shall also include all sums derived by Warner from distribution of
the Picture on a four-wall basis as such term is commonly under-
stood in the motion picture industry.
In subparagraph (d), the parenthetical in the second and third
lines is deleted. Licenses to cable operators referred to in para-
graph 3(d)(iii) specifically include all forms of pay, subscription,
and other types of non-free television.
Paragraph 4: The distribution fee on gross receipts of the Pic-
ture derived by Warner from prime time United States telecast of
the Picture on free television on ABC, NBC or CBS or another
national network (if any) shall be 25%. For a network other than
ABC, NBC or CBS to be considered a national network, it must (i)
own or be affiliated with over 200 television stations or a sufficient
number to give national coverage comparable to ABC, NBC or
CBS; (ii) offer Warner centralized purchasing of motion pictures
for distribution to the owned or affiliated stations; (iii) offer a cen-
tralized clearing for distribution of the Picture over said television
stations (i.e., the network clears telecast of the Picture'over its sta-
tions - not the distributor); (iv) handle itself or through affiliated
stations the sale of advertising; and (v) pay a single pre-agreed
sum for telecast of the Picture over all of its owned and affiliated
stations.
Paragraph 5: If Warner sets up reserves, such reserves must
be reasonable and appropriate, and shall be liquidated in no more
than 18 months, except for reserves for taxes, which Warner may
withhold longer. If Warner sets up a reserve for taxes which
Warner later discovers are not payable, Warner shall credit such
reserve back into gross receipts. In addition, Warner shall reduce
the interest on unrecouped production cost by an amount equal to
the interest which accrued on an amount of production cost equal
to the reserves so withheld. In paragraph 5(a); the cost of tapes
and cassettes referred to therein shall not include any manufactur-
ing costs of home video exhibition or distribution.
In 5(b), subdivision (i) is deleted.
In 5(b) and 5(c), the salaries and expenses of Warner's own
employees will be charged to a Picture only if such employees sub-
stantially work on that Picture directly. Where any Warner adver-
tising or publicity employee (other than an executive supervisory
employee) or facility is used for the Picture, then the salary of
such employee and the cost of such facility (while so used for the
Picture) shall be direct costs under Paragraph 5.
In 5(a) and 5(b), if Warner receives any discounts, rebates or
credits (not including any cash discounts for accelerated payment),
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such discounts, rebates or credits shall be credited to the costs re-
ferred to in subdivision (a) and (b).
In 5(b), reuse fees and costs of recording and manufacturing
masters for soundtrack phonograph records will only be charged as
distribution expenses to the extent the record company does not
pay same.
In 5(d), line 2, the word "gross" shall be inserted before the
word "income." Change the words "Subject to" on line 19 to "Not-
withstanding." A subparagraph (iii) shall be added at the end of
subparagraph (d) with the following: "If Warner receives a refund
from the taxing authority which previously assessed any taxes pre-
viously deducted hereunder, the amount of such refund together
with any interest received thereon shall be credited against sums
deductible under this paragraph 5."
In 5(f), deductible costs and expenses will not'include the sala-
ries of Warner's regularly employed in-house legal or accounting
staff.
In 5(g), the dues and assessments referred to therein shall be
limited to 1% of the gross receipts of the Picture.
In 5(h), the word "reasonably" shall be inserted in between
the words "may deem" and "necessary" on line 5. The last sen-
tence of subparagraph (h) shall be revised to read the following:
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed as a waiver of any of
Participant's warranties contained in this Agreement, or waiver of
any right or remedy at law or otherwise which may exist in favor of
Warner against Participant, which rights may include the follow-
ing: the right to require Participant to reimburse Warner on de-
mand for any liability, cost, damage, or expense arising out of, or
resulting from, any breach by Participant of any warranty, under-
taking or obligation by Participant, or any right on the part of
Warner to recoup or recover any such cost or expense out of Par-
ticipant's share of any monies payable hereunder, rather than
treating such costs or expenses as distribution expenses."
In 5(i) after "gross receipts and net profits of the picture" on
lines 11-12 add the following: "but excluding from this subdivision
(i) any participations in gross receipts and net profits." Delete the
phrase in lines 16-18; "or to compensation for services rendered
beyond any guaranteed period referred to in the foregoing
agreement."
In 5(0), there shall be added at the end thereof the following:
"Insurance recoveries relating to cost of production of the picture
shall be credited first to recoupment of cost of production of the
picture and then to recoupment of distribution expenses. All other
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insurance recoveries relating to distribution expenses as described
in this paragraph 5 shall be credited against distribution expenses.
Distribution expenses which are reimbursed by a third party and
distribution expenses incurred but not ultimately paid by Warner
shall be credited to distribution expenses under paragraph 5 (un-
less such reimbursements and/or payments of expenses are made
by parties to financing arrangements with Warner)."
Paragraph 11: The applicable records subject to audit shall in-
clude the records pertaining to the cost of production of the Pic-
ture. Change 24 to 36 in lines 13 and 20-21. Audits shall not con-
tinue for longer than sixty (60) consecutive business days. The
words "or if an audit is commenced prior thereto, within thirty
(30) days from the completion of the relative audit" in lines 21-23
are deleted and the following substituted: "provided however, that
if an audit is completed at least one hundred twenty (120) days
prior to the expiration of said thirty-six (36) month period, Warner
may give written notice to Participant at any time after ninety (90)
days from the completion of such audit requiring Participant to
advise Warner in writing of any objections to the earnings state-
ment involved, specifying the particulars of such objection, and if
Participant does not make such written objections specifying the
particulars thereof within sixty (60) days from receipt of such no-
tice from Warner or, whether or not Warner gives such written no-
tice to Participant, upon the expiration of said thirty-six (36)
month period, whichever is earlier, Participant shall thereafter be
barred from making any such objection or filing any suit, action or
proceedings against Warner with respect to the earnings statement
involved." Warner preapproves Laventhal & Horworth; Gelfand,
Breslauer, Rennert & Feldman; Selwyn Gerber and Breslauer;
Jacobson, Rutman and Sherman; Phil Hacker & Company and any
of the so called "big six" national accounting firms to conduct au-
dits. In line 17 after the words "more than once", add "except Par-
ticipant shall not be precluded from again examining such records
if the earnings statement is later altered or amended by Warner."
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